| Session: | LHC 3 |
| Chairman: | Louis Henny |
| Secretary: | Albino Vairo |
| Duration of session : | 90 min. (presentations 60 min., discussions 30 min.) |
| An Invitation to Design LHC Systems for TCR Supervision |
| Abstract
With the LHC technical infrastructure in place, one of the main concerns is to achieve maximum availability and reliability through, for example, appropriate operation and supervision. This paper is intended to draw the attention of the experts to the shortcomings of the existing remote supervision of the technical infrastructure. These reduce the efficiency of the Technical Control Room (TCR) due to the large number of alarms. There are alarms generated by maintenance or shutdown activities, those connected to disused hardware and others not indicating an intervention or without sufficient documentation. Systems optimized not only for nominal load but also for operation modes such as accelerator shutdown and system maintenance could significantly decrease the number of alarms and thus reduce system downtime and operational costs. Additionally more sophisticated local and remote control systems could improve the supervision and the analysis of Repetitive Alarms. |
| Recommendations for the LHC Safety Alarms System |
| Abstract
A working group was set up to define the LHC safety alarm system, also known as Alarm-of-Level-3-System (AL3S). The mandate asked for recommendations to be elaborated on four items: the overall concept of the AL3S for machine and experiments, the transmission and display of safety alarms, the AL3S during civil engineering construction, and the transition from the present LEP to the final LHC safety alarm system. The members of the working group represented a wide range of interest and experience including the CERN Fire Brigade, safety officers from experiments and machines, and specialists for safety and control systems. The recommendations highlight the need for a clear definition of responsibilities and procedures, well-engineered homogeneous systems across CERN, and they point to several important issues outside the mandate of the working group. These recommendations were presented, discussed and accepted by several CERN and LHC committees. |
| Safety Alarms and European Standards |
| Abstract
This paper describes the current status and future of the safety-alarm (Alarm-of-Level-3) equipment at CERN. The emphasis is on the classification of these systems in the European standards framework as well as in other relevant international standards. Fire and gas detection systems and evacuation alarms represent the majority (approximately 90%) of the safety-alarm equipment at CERN. We will mainly address issues concerning the functioning of the fire-detection equipment and how it communicates with the Safety Control Room and Technical Control Room. The technological evolution of the equipment will be discussed. We shall also refer to the international and national standards applicable at CERN in the fire-equipment domain. |
| Quality Assurance Plan for the AL3 Test Procedure |
| Abstract
This paper describes the new quality assurance plan for the Alarms Level 3 (AL3) test. The aim of the plan is to introduce engineering techniques and to standardise and simplify the procedures for carrying out tests following Safety Instruction 37 (IS37). The procedures are to co-ordinate all the services involved (fire brigade, maintenance and computer support) and to create a consistent documentation. When the procedures are implemented, it will be possible to determine with confidence how field actions are done and measure actual performance. The focus will be on personnel training and documentation. It is important however to keep documentation and procedures to a reasonable level that can be maintained at appropriate intervals. The plan is the result of an internal requirement from ST/MC and a formal request from Installations Nucléaires de Base (INB). |
| Procédure pour l'Intégration de Plans Assurances Qualité d'Origine Différentes |
| Abstract
Les documents de base, issus de l'application de la série ISO 9000, peuvent se distinguer dans leur contenu, d'une part d'après l'organisation de management interne de l'organisme contractant (Manuel Qualité, Plan Qualité) et, d'autre part d'après l'organisation de la relation client-fournisseur (Manuel Assurance Qualité, Plan Assurance Qualité). Dans le cadre de contrats de longue durée, avec des consortiums, les documents de base se voient multipliés sans réelle garantie que les points délicats du processus (par exemple, communication, circuits d'approbation, etc.) soient clairement décrits. Afin d'éviter de reconsidérer l'ensemble des documents, l'insertion contractuelle de procédures CERN peut faciliter la tâche. Néanmoins des risques de confusion peuvent en résulter. La meilleure façon de faire consiste probablement dans un développement conjoint, entre le CERN et l'organisme contractant, d'un Plan Assurance Qualité dès le départ du contrat. |
| Organization and Management of the LHC Civil Engineering Contracts |
| Abstract
Since July 1994, the CERN Civil Engineering group within the ST division has been preparing and engaging contracts related to the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) project. Several of these contracts have values in excess of 10 MCHF and will be executed over a number of years; as such they represent an important part of the infrastructure works required for the LHC. To date, in excess of two hundred and fifty companies have been consulted in relation to these contracts. Contracts or orders have been placed with over thirty companies or joint ventures of companies from nearly all the CERN Member States. This paper aims to show the inter-relationships between these contracts and how the Civil Engineering group is carrying out the management of these important LHC contracts. The organization of the group will be explained along with the roles of individual members within the group. |
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